Shipbuilding Is Becoming the Language of the U.S.-Korea Alliance
Many people may read the presidential memorandum signed by Donald Trump on August 13, 2026, simply as another example of Washington acting in its own national and economic interests.
That interpretation is understandable. The memorandum explicitly identifies the weakness of the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base as a national-security problem and directs the government to increase shipbuilding capacity, competition, and investment in American shipyards. White House — Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base
But the structure of the policy suggests something broader.
The United States is opening a limited pathway for qualifying foreign shipbuilders to initially construct up to two vessels in their parent shipyards while simultaneously requiring investment, workforce development, technology licensing, and supply-chain development in the United States. White House — August 13, 2026 Presidential Memorandum
For South Korea, this is particularly important.
The measure connects Korean shipbuilding capability with American shipbuilding capacity.
That makes MASGA — Make American Shipbuilding Great Again — more than a discussion about tariffs, investment figures, or individual ship orders.
It raises a larger question:
Can shipbuilding become one of the institutional foundations of the long-term U.S.-Korea alliance?
What the August 2026 Memorandum Actually Does
The most important point is that the memorandum does not simply allow foreign shipyards to build unlimited U.S. Navy vessels.
Instead, it establishes what the memorandum calls the “Finland Model.”
Under the policy, a qualifying foreign supplier must simultaneously build a new shipyard in the United States or acquire ownership or a majority equity position in an existing U.S. shipyard. After the first two ships, subsequent vessels under the program must be built in U.S. shipyards. The foreign supplier must also hire and train an American workforce, license relevant shipbuilding technology, and establish a U.S. supply chain for construction and maintenance. White House — Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base
This distinction is crucial.
The policy is not designed simply to outsource American naval construction.
Its stated objective is to use foreign industrial capability as a bridge toward rebuilding domestic U.S. shipbuilding capacity.
The White House described the mechanism as allowing foreign shipbuilders that make substantial and durable investments in American shipyards and train an American workforce to temporarily build up to two ships in their parent shipyards, with additional ships to be built in revitalized American shipyards. White House — Fact Sheet on Rebuilding the U.S. Navy and Shipbuilding Industrial Base
That is why the policy matters to MASGA.
The National-Security Exception Is the Most Significant Part
The legal mechanism behind the policy is equally important.
The memorandum invokes 10 U.S.C. §8679, which establishes restrictions on construction of vessels for the U.S. Armed Forces in foreign shipyards while allowing a national-security exception under specified conditions.
The August memorandum states that the President determined that increasing domestic shipbuilding capacity through the Finland Model is in the national-security interest of the United States. It then delegates authority to make the relevant national-security determination for individual construction contracts. White House — Presidential Memorandum, Section 3
This produces an interesting policy paradox.
A rule designed to protect U.S. national security by restricting foreign construction is being used, through a national-security exception, to create a limited pathway for foreign construction.
The reason is not simply that foreign shipyards are being preferred.
The stated objective is to use foreign capacity to help rebuild American capacity.
What South Korea Gains From MASGA
South Korea is particularly well positioned because its major shipbuilders already possess large-scale commercial shipbuilding capabilities and have been expanding their involvement in the United States.
The relationship was already developing before the August memorandum.
In October 2025, the White House announced that HD Hyundai and Cerberus Capital Management would pursue a $5 billion program to modernize American shipyards, strengthen supply chains, and apply technologies including autonomous navigation, digitalization, and automation. The same announcement said Samsung Heavy Industries and Vigor Marine Group would cooperate on naval-vessel MRO, shipyard automation, and construction of U.S.-flagged vessels. It also announced a $5 billion Hanwha Ocean infrastructure plan for Philly Shipyard. White House — U.S.-Korea Maritime Partnership, October 29, 2025
The August 2026 memorandum therefore did not create the U.S.-Korea shipbuilding relationship from nothing.
It gave an existing industrial partnership a potentially new procurement mechanism.
Hanwha and Philly Shipyard
Among Korean shipbuilders, Hanwha has a particularly direct connection to the new policy.
Hanwha acquired Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia in December 2024. Yonhap reported that this ownership structure meets the memorandum’s condition concerning ownership or a majority equity position in a U.S. shipyard. Yonhap — Trump signs memo permitting foreign shipbuilders to build up to 2 U.S. ships in their shipyards
This gives Hanwha an important structural position within the policy framework.
But it is important not to confuse positioning with a confirmed contract.
The memorandum creates a procurement pathway; it does not itself award a U.S. Navy shipbuilding contract to Hanwha.
That distinction matters when discussing the future of MASGA.
HD Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries Are Also Part of the Picture
Hanwha is not the only Korean shipbuilder looking toward the U.S. naval market.
In July 2026, Yonhap reported that the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Navy had sent requests for information to HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean concerning their ability to design and build destroyers. Samsung Heavy Industries was also included in a separate request involving medium-sized fleet replenishment vessels. Yonhap — S. Korean shipbuilders eye U.S. naval market
The Korea–U.S. shipbuilding relationship is therefore already moving beyond commercial shipbuilding into naval-capability discussions.
Korean industry participation is also being organized institutionally. South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources announced the launch of the Korea–U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center, involving HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hanwha Ocean, Samsung Heavy Industries and other organizations, with cooperation covering supply chains, workforce development and joint R&D. Korea–U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center — Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources
This is important because it shows that MASGA is becoming an ecosystem rather than a single corporate transaction.
From Tariff Negotiations to Industrial Cooperation
The U.S.-Korea shipbuilding relationship was already part of the broader bilateral investment framework.
The November 2025 U.S.-Korea joint fact sheet stated that South Korea had committed $150 billion in approved investment in the U.S. shipbuilding sector. It also described a shipbuilding working group covering maintenance, repair and overhaul, workforce development, shipyard modernization, and supply-chain resilience. The two countries also identified the potential construction of U.S. vessels in South Korea as part of their maritime cooperation. White House — Joint Fact Sheet on President Trump’s Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung
This changes the way MASGA should be understood.
The central question is no longer simply:
How many ships can Korea build for America?
The more important question is:
How can Korean shipbuilding expertise help rebuild American shipbuilding capacity?
That is a much deeper form of industrial cooperation.
Why Trust Matters More Than Speed
The first two ships may attract the most attention because they represent the most visible change.
But they may not be the most important part of the policy.
The memorandum requires the foreign supplier to establish or acquire U.S. shipyard capacity, train American workers, license relevant proprietary shipbuilding technologies, and establish a U.S. supply chain. After the first two ships, production under the model is to move to U.S. shipyards. White House — Presidential Memorandum, “Finland Model” requirements
That creates a very different relationship from a normal export transaction.
A conventional transaction can end when the ship is delivered.
A shipbuilding ecosystem does not.
It requires:
- engineers,
- shipyard workers,
- suppliers,
- maintenance facilities,
- spare parts,
- technology,
- training,
- software,
- logistics,
- financing, and
- long-term industrial investment.
The longer this network becomes, the more important institutional trust becomes.
Trust in this context does not have to mean personal or political trust.
It can mean something more concrete:
trust embedded in contracts, technology safeguards, supply chains, workforce training, procurement procedures, and institutions.
The 30-Day Congressional Requirement Matters
The process is also deliberately constrained.
The memorandum delegates authority for the relevant national-security determination, but under the statutory framework a contract cannot be made pursuant to the waiver until 30 days after the determination has been received by Congress. White House — Presidential Memorandum, Section 3(d)
That means the August memorandum should not be interpreted as an immediate authorization for unlimited foreign construction.
It establishes a framework.
Individual contracts still have to proceed through the required legal and procurement process.
That institutional process may appear slower than an immediate commercial transaction, but it is significant for the long-term stability of the relationship.
A cooperation framework that survives legal review, congressional notification, procurement procedures and changing administrations is structurally different from a one-time political announcement.
MASGA Is Not Yet the Same as a Confirmed U.S. Navy Order
This distinction deserves emphasis.
The August memorandum creates a pathway for foreign shipbuilders that meet specified conditions. It does not announce that a Korean company has already received a U.S. Navy construction contract.
Yonhap reported that the memorandum permits qualifying foreign shipbuilders to build up to two ships in their parent shipyards while emphasizing that additional ships would be built in U.S. shipyards. Yonhap — Trump signs memo permitting foreign shipbuilders to build up to 2 U.S. ships in their shipyards
That difference is important for both investors and readers.
MASGA represents an expanding opportunity and policy framework, not a guarantee of a specific Korean ship order.
The real economic effect will depend on which ship classes are selected, which companies qualify, how contracts are structured, and how quickly American shipyard capacity can be expanded.
Why the First Two Ships Could Matter
The first two vessels have a particular function under the new model.
They can provide a bridge between existing foreign production capacity and future U.S. production.
The White House describes this as a temporary mechanism designed to provide ships on a quicker timeline while American shipyards are revitalized. White House — Fact Sheet on the U.S. Navy and Shipbuilding Industrial Base
The potential sequence therefore looks like this:
Korean expertise → initial foreign production → U.S. investment → American workforce → U.S. supply chain → U.S. production
If that sequence works, the first ships would be only the beginning.
The more significant outcome would be the industrial infrastructure left behind.
Interdependence Is the Long-Term Bond
Ships are not short-lived consumer products.
They require maintenance and modernization throughout their operational lives.
That is why the November 2025 U.S.-Korea framework specifically included MRO, workforce development, shipyard modernization and supply-chain resilience. White House — U.S.-Korea Maritime Partnership and Shipbuilding Working Group
Once two countries share shipyards, engineers, suppliers, maintenance systems and production technologies, their industrial relationship becomes more interconnected.
This does not eliminate disagreements.
It creates new areas in which the two sides must negotiate:
- intellectual-property protection,
- technology transfer,
- American employment,
- procurement rules,
- cost sharing,
- supply-chain security,
- production responsibilities, and
- national-security restrictions.
But those disagreements occur within an increasingly integrated system.
That is the deeper meaning of shipbuilding as an alliance industry.
The China Factor
The strategic environment provides another reason for the U.S. interest in Korean shipbuilding capabilities.
The August memorandum identifies insufficient shipbuilding capacity, limited competition, backlogs, delays and weaknesses in the supplier base as problems affecting the U.S. maritime industrial base. White House — Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base
At the same time, Korean shipbuilders are increasingly examining the U.S. naval market.
Yonhap reported in July that HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hanwha Ocean and Samsung Heavy Industries were responding to U.S. government interest in their naval shipbuilding capabilities. Yonhap — Korean shipbuilders eye U.S. naval market
This does not mean that Washington is abandoning domestic shipbuilding.
Quite the opposite.
The policy is explicitly designed to rebuild American shipbuilding capacity.
The potential role of Korean shipbuilders is therefore better understood as a bridge: allied industrial capabilities can supplement near-term U.S. capacity while investment and workforce development strengthen the American industrial base.
The Risks Cannot Be Ignored
A serious assessment of MASGA also has to recognize the potential problems.
Technology Transfer
The memorandum specifically requires licensing of proprietary shipbuilding techniques and technologies used at the foreign parent shipyard. White House — Presidential Memorandum, Section 3(a)
That makes intellectual-property protection and technology-security arrangements central issues.
American Jobs
The policy requires qualifying foreign suppliers to hire and train an American workforce.
This is consistent with the broader U.S. objective of using foreign investment to strengthen domestic shipbuilding rather than simply relocating American naval production abroad. White House — Fact Sheet on Rebuilding the U.S. Navy
Limited Foreign Production
The special pathway is limited to the first two ships. Subsequent vessels under the model are to be built in U.S. shipyards. White House — August 13 Presidential Memorandum
For Korean companies, therefore, the long-term opportunity depends heavily on successful U.S.-based operations.
Procurement Uncertainty
The memorandum creates a pathway rather than an automatic contract.
Actual orders will depend on subsequent procurement decisions, national-security determinations, congressional notification and contracting procedures. Yonhap — Trump signs memo permitting foreign shipbuilders to build up to two U.S. ships
Domestic Political and Industrial Debate
Foreign participation in U.S. naval shipbuilding can also generate debate over American jobs, industrial sovereignty, technology security and the appropriate role of foreign companies in defense production.
Those questions are not peripheral.
They will be part of determining whether MASGA can develop into a sustainable industrial partnership.
MASGA’s Real Test Will Come After the Announcement
The August memorandum changes the policy environment.
But the durability of MASGA will depend on implementation.
The critical questions are now practical:
- Which ship classes will actually use the new procurement model?
- Which Korean companies will participate?
- How much production will initially occur in Korea?
- How quickly can U.S. shipyard capacity be expanded?
- How many American workers will be trained?
- Which technologies will be transferred?
- How will proprietary information be protected?
- Can Korean and American suppliers create a reliable integrated supply chain?
- Will the program remain viable through changes in administrations and congressional priorities?
These questions are more important than the headline number of ships.
Because the ultimate objective of the policy is not simply to acquire two ships from overseas.
It is to increase American shipbuilding capacity.
Conclusion: From MASGA to a Shared Shipbuilding Ecosystem
MASGA began as part of a broader conversation about trade, tariffs and investment.
It is now becoming something more complicated.
The United States needs to rebuild its shipbuilding industrial base.
South Korea possesses extensive shipbuilding expertise and is investing heavily in U.S. shipyards and related infrastructure.
The two governments have already established cooperation covering shipbuilding, MRO, workforce development, modernization and supply-chain resilience. White House — U.S.-Korea Maritime Partnership
The August 2026 memorandum now creates a more specific mechanism for connecting those capabilities.
It does not guarantee Korean ship orders.
It does not remove the risks associated with technology transfer, American employment, procurement rules or congressional oversight.
And it does not mean that every economic benefit will automatically be distributed equally between the two countries.
But it does create the possibility of something more durable than a single commercial transaction:
an integrated U.S.-Korea shipbuilding ecosystem.
That is why shipbuilding can become more than an industrial issue.
It can become a language of alliance.
The strongest test of MASGA will not be how many ships Korea builds overseas.
It will be whether Korean shipbuilding expertise, American investment, American workers and U.S.-based supply chains can ultimately produce a stronger American maritime industrial base.
If that happens, MASGA will have moved beyond a bargaining instrument in trade negotiations.
It will have become a long-term investment in industrial interdependence, institutional cooperation and the practical infrastructure of the U.S.-Korea alliance.
And that may be the most important ship MASGA is actually trying to build: not merely a vessel, but a durable industrial relationship between two allied shipbuilding nations.
Peter Yang