On September 21, 2026, an explosion believed to have been caused by a landmine occurred in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the western front, injuring three soldiers from the Army’s 25th Division. Among them, the search battalion commander suffered a severe injury resulting in the amputation of his ankle, and another officer sustained a fracture. According to Yonhap News Agency’s report on September 21, the military stated at the time that it had not yet been confirmed whether the mine had been planted by North Korean forces or was one of South Korea’s own.
However, the essence of this incident cannot simply be dismissed as an “unfortunate accident.”
This was not a routine search operation conducted in an area with no known risk information. Our military had already identified changes in the terrain near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and was preparing for a United Nations Command (UNC) field investigation, mindful of the possibility that North Korea had planted mines south of the MDL, when the accident occurred. The fact that our military was clearing a new search route for that very field investigation on the day of the accident was confirmed by Yonhap’s report on September 22.
Therefore, the question the public must ask should not stop at simply “Who planted the mine?”
A more important question is this:
To what extent did the government and the military know about the danger, and did they take safety measures commensurate with that risk?
1. This Was Not an Accident About Which the Risk Was Entirely Unknown
At a briefing the day after the accident, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) revealed that it had already identified terrain changes near the MDL on the western front and had been consulting with the UNC over the possibility that North Korea had planted mines south of the MDL, and that the operation during which the accident occurred was a route-clearing operation intended to create conditions for the UNC’s field investigation, according to the Yonhap report.
If that is the case, the government and military must explain:
Why did a new search route need to be cleared when the area was already recognized as a danger zone?
Of course, according to the JCS’s explanation, as conveyed in the same Yonhap report, the soldiers used mine detectors and wore protective gear including protective suits and mine-resistant overshoes.
But the fact that they wore equipment is not the same proposition as the claim that the operational plan was sufficiently safe.
In fact, it has come to light through Yonhap’s report on September 23 that two separate explosions occurred at the accident site, with the second explosion reportedly occurring while the battalion commander was in the process of rescuing the injured; that the accident site was only tens of meters from an area suspected of having North Korean mines; and that the military is investigating every possibility, including not only North Korean anti-personnel mines but also mines that may have washed downstream along a river.
Given this situation, an independent and thorough investigation is needed into whether the prior risk assessment and on-site operational procedures were adequate.
2. North Korea’s Military Activity in the DMZ Had Already Been Ongoing for Some Time
To understand this incident, one must also look at North Korea’s recent activity in the DMZ.
North Korea has continued installing fences and tactical roads and planting mines throughout the DMZ area. The fact that in November 2025 the Ministry of National Defense officially proposed inter-Korean military talks to North Korea to discuss the issue of establishing MDL reference lines, citing the loss of many MDL markers and the potential for MDL violations during North Korean construction work, is reported in Yonhap’s article of November 17, 2025.
Yet North Korean MDL violations continued even after that proposal for talks. According to Yonhap’s report of November 20, 2025, North Korean forces again violated the MDL during construction work inside the DMZ, and our military responded with warning broadcasts and warning shots.
In other words, it is not the case that the Lee Jae-myung government was entirely unaware of North Korea’s activity near the MDL.
On the contrary, the government had already raised the issue of MDL management itself, and the possibility of repeated North Korean incursions, as a formal agenda item for military talks.
If that is so, the scope of responsibility the government must answer for following this incident should be correspondingly broader.
3. “Dialogue” and “Deterrence” Are Not Separate Issues
The Lee Jae-myung government has publicly emphasized a policy of lowering military tension on the Korean Peninsula and pursuing peaceful coexistence.
The fact that on September 22, 2026, President Lee, in a meeting with the UN Secretary-General, stated that under the belief that “peace that requires no fighting is the surest form of security,” the government is working to build a Korean Peninsula where the two Koreas coexist peacefully and grow together, can be confirmed through the official briefing from Cheong Wa Dae.
Pursuing peaceful coexistence and easing tension is not, in itself, incompatible with maintaining military readiness.
Indeed, the Ministry of National Defense officially explained in November 2025 a “two-track” approach that pursues both deterrence through a robust ROK-U.S. combined defense posture and the easing of military tension in parallel, as stated in the Ministry of National Defense’s official material.
Therefore, the issue is not “whether or not to pursue dialogue.”
The issue is whether our military maintains sufficient deterrence and on-the-ground response capability even when North Korea does not respond to dialogue.
The fact that North Korea did not respond to South Korea’s proposal for military talks in November 2025, and that MDL violations occurred even immediately afterward, is already documented in Yonhap’s report from that time.
In such a situation, military preparedness premised on worst-case scenarios becomes all the more important, alongside any proposal for dialogue.
4. The Heaviest Responsibility in This Incident Concerns “Risk Management”
As of now, it has not been confirmed whether the mine was North Korean or South Korean.
Therefore, it is not appropriate at this point to assert definitively that this was the work of North Korea.
But conversely, there is no reason to postpone scrutiny of the military’s operational plan simply because it has not yet been confirmed whether the mine was North Korean.
Rather, two investigations should proceed simultaneously.
First, the origin of the explosive device must be determined.
Whether the device was a mine planted by North Korean forces, a mine previously planted by our own military, a mine that had washed downstream, or some other explosive device must be determined through forensic analysis by the National Forensic Service and a UNC field investigation — a point also emphasized in Yonhap’s September 23 report.
Second, the safety of the operation must be investigated.
Regardless of the origin of the explosive device, the following matters must be investigated separately:
- How was the prior risk assessment of the accident area conducted?
- To what extent was information about the possibility of North Korean mines shared with the operational personnel?
- Were alternative routes considered in the process of selecting the new search route?
- Were the mine-detection procedures carried out in full accordance with military manuals?
- Were the detection limits of the mine detectors and the terrain conditions sufficiently accounted for?
- Was an adequate safety distance maintained between the lead search team and the following personnel?
- Were rescue procedures in place in anticipation of the possibility of a second explosion?
- Was the possibility of an accident adequately communicated to the on-site commander?
This is what genuine protection of service members means.
5. It Is Not Enough for the Government to Emphasize Only “Post-Accident Support”
The fact that President Lee Jae-myung stated immediately after the accident that the government would provide all necessary support for the treatment and recovery of the injured service members can be confirmed in Newsis’s report of September 21.
Treatment and support for injured service members are, of course, important.
But the state’s responsibility does not exist only after an accident occurs.
Eliminating risk as much as possible before service members are deployed into a dangerous area is equally a responsibility of the state.
Therefore, the government’s response to this incident must not end with:
“We will support the treatment and recovery of the injured service members.”
The public has the right to demand the next level of answers:
“Why were service members deployed to that operation, what did the government know before the deployment, what safety measures were taken, and what failed?”
An answer to this question is necessary.
6. The Lee Jae-myung Government’s Security Policy Must Now Be Verified Not by “Words” But by “the Field”
The Lee Jae-myung government has presented peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula as a core direction of its North Korea policy. The fact that it emphasized peaceful coexistence and dialogue again on the UN stage in September 2026 is contained in Cheong Wa Dae’s official briefing.
However, North Korea’s actions must be evaluated separately from the government’s policy declarations.
If North Korea is installing mines and fences around the MDL, and our military, while conducting actual operations in that dangerous area, has produced seriously injured soldiers, then the success or failure of North Korea policy must also be verified against the standard of on-the-ground safety and deterrence, not against declarations or slogans.
This is the most important security-policy question raised by this incident.
7. The Government’s Lukewarm Attitude Is Both a Security Threat and a Deception of the Public
There is one more issue that must be addressed here: the ambiguity itself of the attitude the government has shown toward North Korea.
The government had already recognized the terrain changes near the MDL and the possibility of North Korean mine-planting to the extent that it was consulting with the UNC about it, as confirmed by Yonhap’s September 22 report. It had also already publicly acknowledged repeated North Korean MDL violations, as shown in Yonhap’s November 20, 2025 report. And yet, as seen in Cheong Wa Dae’s UN-related briefing, the government’s public messaging has consistently emphasized “peaceful coexistence” and “dialogue,” while responding to North Korea’s concrete military threats with relatively restrained, and at times ambiguous, language.
Of course, it can be acknowledged that restrained language is sometimes necessary in diplomatic and security matters. But restraint and ambiguity are not the same thing. Restraint is adjusting the level of expression while clearly recognizing the facts; ambiguity is what prevents the public from gauging the actual level of threat. The fact that, even after an incident in which a service member suffered severe injury, the JCS’s explanation remained at the level of “it has not been confirmed whose mine it was” — as confirmed in Yonhap’s September 21 report — and the government has not specifically explained to the public the level of risk information it had known beforehand, or the response measures taken accordingly, does more than fail to satisfy the public’s right to know — it effectively results in understating the true scale of the threat.
This lukewarm and ambiguous attitude creates problems on three levels.
First, rather than protection, it inflicts harm on the public and leaves them disappointed. If the government, faced with an incident in which a battalion commander suffered the severe injury of ankle amputation, limits itself to a formulaic expression of regret and a promise of post-accident support — as described in the Newsis report — this means the state failed in its responsibility to protect its service members from danger, and the result is harm rather than protection. The public finds it difficult to trust how seriously the government is treating security matters, and since pursuing peace and taking a clear stance in the face of a threat are separate matters, if the government appears to be conflating the two, that disappointment can only accumulate.
Second, it poses a real threat to security. If the government fails to issue clear warnings and pursue accountability for North Korea’s provocative actions and instead maintains an ambiguous posture, this risks being interpreted by North Korea as a false signal. As shown by the fact that MDL violations continued even after North Korea failed to respond to the proposal for military talks in November 2025 — documented in the Yonhap report — deterrence is not completed by military capability alone. Deterrence becomes effective only when clear recognition of the threat is backed by a corresponding political message. If ambiguous attitudes are repeated, there is a risk that North Korea will interpret this as a “gap in response,” which could in turn become a gap in security.
Third, it results in deceiving the public. The manner in which the government only referenced, in general terms, risk information it already knew — terrain changes near the MDL, the possibility of North Korean mine-planting, repeated MDL violations — through materials such as the Ministry of National Defense’s November 2025 statement, without proactively and adequately explaining it to the public beforehand, and only disclosed it piecemeal after the accident occurred — through the September 22 and September 23 reports — effectively amounts to exploiting an asymmetry of information to the public’s disadvantage. If the public could not gauge the actual level of threat from the government’s public statements alone, then the public was, in itself, excluded from information it was entitled to know. Even if this cannot be characterized definitively as intentional concealment, it is difficult to escape the criticism that it produces a deceptive effect that clouds the public’s judgment.
What is therefore demanded of the government is not that it abandon the discourse of peace. It is that the government fulfill the dual responsibility of speaking of peace while also speaking clearly, without evasion, about threats. Ambiguity may be read not as prudence but as an evasion of responsibility, and the cost of that ultimately returns in the form of lost public trust and an actual gap in security.
8. The Government Must Disclose Six Things to the Public
The National Assembly’s and the government’s investigation into this incident must, at minimum, answer the following six questions.
First. What exactly was the explosive device at the accident site?
Second. When did the military first become aware of the possibility that North Korean forces had planted mines south of the MDL?
Third. At what point was that information conveyed to the operational commander and the service members on the ground?
Fourth. What was the specific operational rationale for deciding to clear a new search route despite knowing the risk?
Fifth. What problems existed in the operational plan and the on-site safety procedures?
Sixth. What operational, equipment, and intelligence-system improvements will be implemented to prevent the same type of accident from happening again?
Only when the answers to these questions are disclosed can the public judge how the government’s security policy is actually functioning.
Conclusion
This DMZ landmine explosion incident must not be judged solely on the question of whether it was a North Korean provocation.
If it was a North Korean mine, North Korea’s activity around the MDL and the issue of the Armistice Agreement must be addressed with the utmost seriousness.
If it was one of our own military’s mines, our military’s mine management and operational safety systems must be fundamentally reexamined.
If it was a mine that had washed downstream, the mine-management and detection systems for the DMZ and border areas must be reviewed once again.
In every case, one common question remains.
Why were service members injured in an area whose danger was already known?
This incident poses a problem for the Lee Jae-myung government that is not simply about supporting injured service members, but about explaining to the public how the state assesses military risk and how it protects its service members.
Peace matters.
Dialogue is necessary.
But military readiness capable of protecting service members must be maintained even in the moment the other side refuses to engage in dialogue.
The government’s true responsibility in this incident, therefore, lies neither in prematurely pointing to North Korea nor in politically minimizing the incident.
What matters first is transparently disclosing to the public what the government knew, when it knew it, what judgments it made, why it carried out that operation, and what failed.
As long as the government maintains an ambiguous posture on security matters, that ambiguity will erode public trust, widen the gap in deterrence, and ultimately result in deceiving the public.
Before demanding courage of its service members, the state must, as much as possible, reduce the situations in which they must risk their lives.
That is the state’s most fundamental security responsibility.
Peter Yang